Deep neural networks (DNNs) are increasingly critical in modern safety-critical systems, for example in their perception layer to analyze images. Unfortunately, there is a lack of methods to ensure the functional safety of DNN-based components. The machine learning literature suggests one should trust DNNs demonstrating high accuracy on test sets. In case of low accuracy, DNNs should be retrained using additional inputs similar to the error-inducing ones.
INTRODUCTION
Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) are common building blocks in many modern software systems. This is particularly true for cyberphysical systems (e.g., their perception layer) and the automotive sector, where DNN-based products have shown the capability to automate difficult tasks. For example, DNNs are used in Advanced Driver Assistance Systems (ADAS) to automate driving tasks such as emergency braking or lane changing [23, 31] . The rise of DNNbased systems does not concern only large companies but also component manufacturers that produce intelligent car components built on top of DNNs [12, 35] . This is the case of IPA [12] , the company providing the case studies in this paper, who develops in-vehicle monitoring systems such as drowsiness detection and gaze detection systems [22] .
DNNs consist of layers of hundreds of neurons transforming high-dimensional vectors through linear and non-linear activation functions, whose parameters are learned during training. Such structure prevents engineers from understanding the rationale of predictions through manual inspection of DNNs and, consequently, inhibits software quality assurance practices that rely on the analysis and understanding of the system logic. Such practices include failure root cause analysis and program debugging, which are the target of this paper.
With DNN-based systems, root cause analysis consists characterizing system inputs that lead to erroneous DNN results. For example, in image classification tasks, a root cause of DNN errors could be the presence of long hair, leading the DNN to label most female doctors as nurses [28] . Once the root causes of the observed DNN errors have been identified, the DNN can be efficiently retrained after including in the training set additional images featuring these error-inducing characteristics.
When DNN-based systems are used in a safety-critical context, root cause analysis is required to support safety analysis. Indeed, safety standards such as ISO26262 [10] and ISO/PAS 21448 [11] enforce the identification of the situations in which the system might be unsafe (i.e., provide erroneous outputs) and the design of countermeasures to put in place (e.g., integrating different types of sensors). In the case of DNN-based systems, because of their complex structure, the identification of unsafe situations can be performed only through root cause analysis.
When inputs are images, which is our focus here, existing solutions for root cause analysis generate heatmaps that use colors to capture the importance of pixels in their contribution to a DNN result [19, 28] . By inspecting the heatmaps generated for a set of erroneous results, a human operator can determine that these heatmaps highlight the same objects, which may suggest the root cause of the problem (e.g., long hair [28] ). Based on the identified root cause, engineers can then retrain the DNN using additional arXiv:2002.00863v1 [cs.SE] 3 Feb 2020 images with similar characteristics. Unfortunately, this process is expensive and error-prone because it relies on the visual inspection of many generated heatmaps. MODE goes beyond visual inspection and supports the automated debugging of DNNs [16] . Unfortunately, MODE cannot support safety analysis practices because it does not provide support to identify plausible and distinct root causes leading to DNN errors.
To overcome the limitations above, we propose Heatmap-based Unsupervised Debugging of DNNs (HUDD). HUDD relies on hierarchical agglomerative clustering [13] to identify, in the heatmaps of internal DNN layers, the distinct root causes of DNN errors and uses this information to effectively retrain the DNN. Different from MODE, which relies on heatmap differences, by relying on clustering combined with a specific heatmap-based distance function, HUDD can automatically identify the presence of distinct root causes for the observed DNN errors, even in cases where such causes are infrequent.
HUDD relies on the computed clusters to identify new images to be used to retrain the DNN. More precisely, given a potentially large set of unlabeled images, HUDD selects the subset of images that are more likely to belong to the identified clusters. These images are assumed to capture root causes of DNN errors and are then used to retrain the network.
We performed an empirical evaluation on four DNNs. Our empirical results show that HUDD can automatically and accurately identify the different root causes of DNN errors. Also, our results show that the HUDD retraining process, even when applied to extremely accurate DNN models, improves DNN accuracy up to 9.38 percentage points and is more effective than baseline approaches.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the context and motivation for this work. Section 3 presents background information. Section 4 provides the technical details of the proposed approach. Section 5 reports on the results of our empirical evaluation. Section 6 discusses related work. Section 7 concludes the paper.
MOTIVATION AND CONTEXT
In this section, we introduce the context of our research, i.e., safety analysis and debugging of DNN-based automotive systems. We explain why automated root cause analysis is necessary to enable functional safety analysis for DNN-based automotive systems. Also, we show how DNN accuracy improvement can be facilitated by the automated identification of error-inducing inputs (i.e., inputs that make the DNN generate erroneous results).
DNN-based automotive systems
Our work is motivated by the challenges encountered in industry sectors developing safety-critical systems, such as in IPA [12] , a supplier of sensing solutions active in the automotive market and the provider of our case studies. For example, IPA develops a gaze detection system (GDS) which uses DNNs to determine the gaze direction of the driver, from images captured by a camera on the instrument panel of the car.
IPA is evaluating the feasibility of different GDS system architectures. Figure 1 shows an architecture consisting of three DNNs (i.e., CropDNN, GazeDNN_L, GazeDNN_R). CropDNN identifies Figure 1 : DNN-based system for gaze detection. Figure 2 : Gaze directions.
face landmarks that enable the cropping of images containing the eyes only. GazeDNN_L and GazeDNN_R classify the gaze direction into eight classes (i.e., TopLeft, TopCenter, TopRight, MiddleLeft, MiddleRight, BottomLeft, BottomCenter, and BottomRight).
To reduce training costs, IPA relies on training sets containing images that are collected from driving scenes and images generated by simulation software. Simulators are used to reduce the costs related to data collection and data labeling. Indeed, models of the dynamics of real-world elements (e.g., eyeballs) are used to generate hundreds of images in a few hours [33] . Further, and this is important in terms of cost saving, simulation enables the processing of model parameters used to generate the images in order to automatically assign labels to them.
In our experiments with IPA, we rely on the UnityEyes simulator to generate eye images [33] . UnityEyes combines a generative 3D model of the human eye region with a real-time rendering framework to generate eye images. We determine the gaze direction label from the gaze angle parameter provided by UnityEyes, based on predefined gaze ranges depicted in Figure 2 . For example, we assign the label TopCenter when the gaze angle is between 67.5 and 112.5 degrees. When images collected from driving scenes are used, labels must be assigned manually and this is expensive. The labeled images are then used to train and test the DNN.
Debugging of DNN-based Systems
IPA engineers train the DNNs that compose their systems by following the standard machine learning process depicted in Figure 3 -a. They first train the DNN using a training set with labeled images (Step A) and then execute the DNN against a labeled test set (Step B). This process enables engineers to evaluate the DNN accuracy (i.e., the portion of images leading to correct results).
When the accuracy of the system is not adequate, engineers improve the DNN by augmenting the training set with error-inducing images. This process is depicted in Figure 3 -b. First, engineers generate a set of new images to be used to retrain the DNN (Step C). We call this set of images improvement set. The improvement set generally consists of images collected from the field since these tend to be error-inducing when DNNs have been trained using simulator images. Real-world images must be manually labelled (Step D). The DNN model is tested with the improvement set and images that lead to DNN errors are identified (Step E). This set of error-inducing (unsafe) images is considered to retrain the DNN (
Step G), using as initial configuration for DNN weights the ones in the previously trained model. To improve the DNN, it is necessary to process a sufficiently large number of unsafe images. For this reason, the number of unsafe images can be augmented by applying bagging (i.e., by replicating samples in the unsafe set) till a target is achieved (Step F). Finally, the improved DNN can be assessed on the test set (Step H).
Even with bagging, generating a sufficiently diverse set of errorinducing inputs that include all possible causes of DNN errors might be very difficult. When the labeling of such images is manual, the costs of labeling becomes prohibitive and DNN improvement is infeasible. For this reason, automatically characterizing images that are likely to lead to DNN errors would allow the image generation or selection to target specific types of images and increase the efficiency of the DNN retraining process.
Functional safety analysis
IPA products must comply with the functional safety standards ISO 26262 and ISO/PAS 21448. Functional safety is ensured by identifying, for each component of the product (e.g., the DNNs of the GDS), the unsafe conditions that could lead to hazards, by identifying countermeasures (e.g., redundant components), and by demonstrating that these unsafe conditions are unlikely.
ISO/PAS 21448, targeting autonomous systems, recommends to determine unsafe conditions by following the traditional DNN testing process depicted in Figure 3 -a and by manually inspecting the error-inducing tests to look for root causes of DNN errors. In a DNN context, unsafe conditions thus correspond to root causes of DNN errors.
According to ISO/PAS 21448, engineers can set a quantitative target for accuracy evaluation to demonstrate that unsafe situations are unlikely. However, ISO/PAS 21448 also clarifies that quantitative targets should overlook potentially hazardous scenarios, thus implying that engineers are liable for errors made when defining the test set.
In addition, the manual identification of unsafe conditions is error-prone. For example, engineers may overlook unsafe conditions that are underrepresented in the test set. Also, underrepresented unsafe conditions may lead to a false estimation of the accuracy of the system. For example, UnityEyes generates eye images where the horizontal angle of the head is determined based on a uniform distribution, between 160 (head turned right) and 220 degrees (head turned left). This configuration leads to very few images with an angle of 160 degrees, and though it is an unsafe condition (i.e., it leads to the estimation of a wrong gaze direction because the eye is barely visible), such experiments with UnityEyes suggests the DNN is very accurate. It is, however, important for engineers to know that the DNN is unsafe when the driver turns his head while driving.
In summary, accuracy estimation results depend on the test set, which may not include all unsafe conditions in a representative or balanced manner. Automated root cause analysis helps making sure, through clustering, that even rare, unsafe conditions are made visible to the analyst, especially when analysis time is limited. In other words, clustering based on heatmaps makes safety analysis robust to imperfect test sets.
BACKGROUND 3.1 DNN Explanation and Heatmaps
Approaches that aim to explain DNN results have been developed in recent years [6] . Most of these concern the generation of heatmaps that capture the importance of pixels in image predictions. They include black-box [5, 24] and white-box approaches [19, 28, 30, 34, 38] . Black-box approaches generate heatmaps for the input layer and do not provide insights regarding internal DNN layers. In this paper, we therefore resort to white box approaches which rely on the backpropagation of the relevance score computed by the DNN [19, 28, 30, 34, 38] ; Castanon et al. provide an overview of the state of the art [4] . In this paper, we rely on Layer-Wise Relevance Propagation (LRP) [19] because of the limitations of other approaches. First, solutions [38] backpropagating only the difference in activations between the different classes may compromise clustering. Deconvolutional networks [34] and guided backpropagation [30] lead to sparse heatmaps that do not fully explain the DNN result [26] . Grad-CAM [28] does not enable the generation of heatmaps for convolutional DNN layers. LRP, instead, generates precise, non-sparse heatmaps for all the DNN layers because it takes into account all the different factors affecting the relevance of a neuron, which include the DNN structure and the neuron activations.
LRP redistributes the relevance scores of neurons in a higher layer to those of the lower layer. Assuming j and k to be two consecutive layers of the DNN, LRP propagates the relevance scores computed for a given layer k into a neuron of the lower layer j. It has been theoretically justified as a form of Taylor decomposition [20] . Figure 4 illustrates the execution of LRP on a fully connected network used to classify inputs. LRP analyzes the data processed by a DNN and can be applied to any DNN architecture. In the forward pass, the DNN receives an input and generates an output (e.g., classifies the gaze direction as TopLeft) while keeping trace of the activations of each neuron. The heatmap is generated in a backward pass.
In Figure 4 , blue lines show that the DNN score of the selected class is backpropagated to lower layers. Plain lines show the connections concerned by the propagation formula used to compute the relevance (R ji ) of neuron i at layer j from all the connected neurons in layer k. The relevance R ji is computed as follow:
where z ji_kl captures the extent to which neuron ji has contributed to make neuron kl relevant, and R kl captures the relevance of neuron l at layer k. For linear layers, z ji_kl = a ji * w + ji_kl , where a ji is the activation of neuron i at layer j and w + ji_kl is the value of the weight on the connection between neuron ji and neuron ki, considering positive weights only. The denominator is used to redistribute the relevance received by a neuron to the lower layer proportionally to relative contributions. In our experiments, we have applied LRP to Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs) using Linear, MaxPooling and Convolutional layers [7] . We rely on the LRP and z jk definitions and implementation provided by LRP authors [18] .
The heatmap in Figure 4 shows that the result computed by the DNN was mostly influenced by the pupil and part of the eyelid, which are the non-white parts in the heatmap.
An additional key benefit of LRP is that it enables the computation of internal heatmaps, i.e., heatmaps for the internal layers of the DNN, based on the relevance score computed for every neuron in every layer. An internal heatmap for a layer k consists of a matrix with the relevance scores computed for all the neurons of layer k.
Unsupervised Learning
Unsupervised learning concerns the automated identification of patterns in data sets without pre-existing labels. In this paper we rely on cluster analysis, which aims to divide datasets into distinct groups of observations that are more similar than observations in other groups. In this paper, we rely on hierarchical agglomerative clustering (HAC) [13] to identify groups of error-inducing images with similar characteristics. HAC is a bottom up approach in which each observation starts in its own cluster and pairs of clusters are iteratively merged into a sequence of nested partitions. The input of HAC is a matrix capturing the distance between every observation pair. The grouping that occurs at each step aims to minimize the objective function. In HAC, a widely adopted objective function, which we use in our work, is the error sum of squares (i.e., Ward's Method [32] ), which represents loss of information and helps minimize the within-cluster variance. At every step, a distance matrix capturing the distance between clusters is updated based on the Lance-Williams dissimilarity update formula [21] .
HAC leads to a hierarchy of clusters which can be represented as a dendrogram. To automatically identify the optimal number of clusters, we rely on the computation of the silhouette coefficient, which is standard practice since it maximizes cohesion (i.e., how closely related objects are in a cluster) and separation (i.e., how well-separated a cluster is from other clusters).
We chose HAC over popular solutions such as K-means [17] and DBSCAN [15] since, thanks to the Lance-Williams dissimilarity update formula and as opposed to K-means, it does not require the computation of cluster centroids, which could be particularly expensive in our context where differences between observations are computed from large heatmap matrices. As for DBSCAN [15] , it does not work well if clusters are expected to have significantly varying cohesion, which might be the case in our context, depending on simulator configurations. We leave to future work the evaluation of other clustering solutions. Figure 5 provides an overview of our approach, HUDD, which consists of six steps.
THE HUDD APPROACH
In Step 1, HUDD performs heatmap-based clustering. This is a core contribution of this paper and consists of three activities: (1) generate heatmaps for the error-inducing test set images, (2) compute distances between every pair of images using a distance function based on the heatmap of each image, and (3) execute hierarchical agglomerative clustering to group images based on the computed distances.
Step 1 leads to the identification of root cause clusters, i.e., clusters of images with a common root cause for the observed DNN errors. In Step 2, engineers inspect the root cause clusters (typically a small number of representative images) to identify unsafe conditions, as required by functional safety analysis.
In Step 3, engineers rely on real-world data or simulation software to generate a new set of images to retrain and improve the DNN.
In Step 4, HUDD automatically identifies the subset of images belonging to the improvement set that are likely to lead to DNN errors, referred to as unsafe set. It is obtained by assigning the images of the improvement set to the root cause clusters according to their heatmap-based distance. Since root cause clusters characterize only the portion of the input space that is unsafe, images belonging to the improvement set may not belong to any of these clusters. For this reason, HUDD selects only images that are sufficiently close to cluster members, so that it does not reduce cluster cohesion. Also, since the unsafe set is used for retraining, for practical reasons related to available time and human resources, HUDD selects up to a user-specified number of images per cluster.
In Step 5, engineers manually label the images belonging to the unsafe set, if needed (e.g., in the case of real images). Different from traditional practice (see Figure 3 -b), HUDD requires that engineers label only a small subset of the improvement set.
In Step 6, to improve the accuracy of the DNN for every root cause observed, independently from their frequency of appearance in the training set, HUDD balances the labeled unsafe set using a bagging approach.
In Step 7, the DNN model is retrained by relying on a training set that consists of the union of the original training set and the balanced labeled unsafe set.
The following sections describe in detail all the steps of the approach, except Steps 3 and 5, which were introduced in Section 2.2.
Heatmap-based clustering
HUDD is based on the intuition that, since heatmaps capture the relevance of each neuron on DNN results, error-inducing inputs sharing the same root cause should show similar heatmaps. For this reason, to identify the root causes of DNN errors, we rely on clustering based on heatmaps. Figure 6 provides an overview of our clustering approach.
For each error-inducing image in the test set, HUDD relies on LRP to generate heatmaps of internal DNN layers. Each heatmap captures the relevance score of each neuron in that layer.
The generated heatmaps are used to generate, for each DNN layer, a distance matrix that captures the distance between every pair of error-inducing image in the test set. The distance between a pair of images ⟨a, b⟩, at layer L, is computed as follows: where H L x is the heatmap computed for image x at layer L. EuclideanDistance is a function that computes the euclidean distance between two N × M matrices according to the formula
where A i, j and B i, j are the values in the cell at row i and column j of the matrix. For each layer, we identify clusters of images by relying on the HAC algorithm and by selecting the optimal number of clusters for that layer using the Silhouette Coefficient (see Section 3.2).
Since DNN layers have the objective of transforming data into more abstract representations [3] , clustering results may vary from layer to layer. In our context, clustering results are informative if they group together images that are misclassified for a same reason. HUDD identifies the layer with the most cohesive clusters based on the weighted average intra-cluster distance (WeightedAvgICD), which we define according to the following formula
where L l is a specific layer of the DNN, |L l | is the number of clusters in the layer L l , ICD is the intra-cluster distance for cluster C i belonging to layer L l , |C j | is the number of elements in cluster C j , while |C | is the number of images in all the clusters. In Formula 3, ICD(L l , C j ) is computed as
where p i is a unique pair of images in cluster C j , and N j is the total number of pairs it contains. The superscripts a and b refer to the two images of the pair to which the distance formula is applied. HUDD selects the layer L m with the minimal WeightedAvgICD. By definition, the clusters generated for layer L m are the ones that maximize cohesion and we therefore expect they group together images that present similar characteristics, suggesting root causes for DNN errors. In Formula 3, the factor |C j | |C | normalizes the average ICD with respect to the relative size of the cluster. This normalization enables HUDD to penalize layers including large clusters with high ICD. These clusters group together images with heatmaps that are different from each other and thus may lead to DNN errors due to different root causes.
Root Causes Inspection
Root cause clusters are then inspected by engineers to determine unsafe conditions. For example, Figure 7 shows the clusters generated for the GazeDNN in Figure 1 on a test set with eye images generated by UnityEyes. To simplify the understanding of root causes, we printed the gaze angle on each image. Clusters C1 and C2 group together images that lead to DNN errors because the pupil is barely visible. Clusters C3 and C4 group images that are misclassified because having a gaze angle that is close to the classification threshold. Cluster C5 shows images that are misclassified because the training set labels are incomplete and do not correctly capture the case of an eye looking middle center.
C1
C2 C3 C4 C5 Figure 7 : Clustering results for GazeDNN.
Clusters C1, C2, and C5 show that HUDD goes beyond the identification of root causes that can be expected (e.g., borderline cases for gaze angle) but identifies also errors due to an incomplete definition of the classes to be predicted (i.e., the middle center gaze detected by cluster C5 and the closed eyes detected by cluster C2) and simulator-specific problems (i.e., the uncommon face position detected by cluster C1). Providing support for identifying such limitations is one of the major strengths of our approach.
Identification of Unsafe Images
HUDD processes the improvement set to automatically identify potentially unsafe images. This is done by assigning improvement set images to root cause clusters while limiting the number of assigned images to a user-specified threshold U .
To assign images to clusters, HUDD follows the same method adopted for generating clusters: the Ward method. An image y belonging to the improvement set IS should be assigned to the cluster C j if the error sum of squares, SSE(C j ′ ) with C j ′ = C j ∪ y, is less than that of the other clusters C c .
Since computing the cluster centroid is infeasible in our context (see Section 3.2), HUDD computes SSE(C j ′ ) in terms of all pairwise distances [21] , as follows
The term p i represents a unique pair of images as in Equation 4, N j ′ the total number of pairs in cluster C j ′ , and |C j ′ | refers to the number of images in cluster C j ′ .
Following the Ward method, HUDD selects cluster C j with a minimum SSE over all clusters: Figure 8 shows the pseudocode of our algorithm for identifying unsafe images based on the Ward method. It requires the root cause clusters R, a configuration parameter U indicating the maximum number of images per cluster to return, and two distance matrices DM TS and DM IS . DM TS is the distance matrix based on the errorinducing test set images that was used to create the root cause clusters in Step 1. DM IS captures the heatmap distances between Require: R, root cause clusters. Require: DM T S , distance matrix for the unsafe test set TS at layer L. The matrix is m x m, where m is the number of error-inducing inputs in TS.
Require: DM I S , distance matrix capturing the distance between images in the improvement set and images in TS.
Require: U , max number of improvement set images per cluster to return
Ensure: an associative array with the unsafe images associated to each root cause cluster 1: unsafeImages ← emptyList; unsafeSet ← emptySet 2: for y belonging to IS do 3:
for C j in R do
4:
SSE_C j = 0; ICD_C j = 0 ; ICD_C j ′ = 0 ; pairs = 0 5:
for t, image belonging to C j do
6:
for u, image belonging to C j do 7:
if index of t < index of u then 8:
:
10:
pairs += 1 11:
13:
14:
ICD_C j = ICD_C j /pairs 15:
16
17:
store(y, c, ICD_C j , ICD_C j ′, SSE_C j , SSE_C j ′ )
18:
identify cluster C j with minimal SSE_C j ′ and retrieve ICD_C j ′ and ICD_C j
19:
if ICD_C j ′ ≤ ICD_C j then 20:
unsafeImages ← ⟨y, C j ⟩ 21: for C j in C do 22:
imgs ← select U images in unsafeImages with lowest SSE_C j ′ and C j as right term
23:
unsafeSet ← unsafeSet ∪ ⟨C j , imgs⟩ 24: Return unsafeSet Figure 8 : Algorithm for the identification of unsafe images the images in IS and the images in the error-inducing test set, for the layer selected for the identification of root cause clusters.
In Figure 8 , Lines 3 to 17 compute SSE based on Equation 5 . Line 19 verifies that the image y, in addition to be assignable to cluster C j according to the Ward method, is indeed unsafe. Indeed, the Ward method alone is not sufficient to identify unsafe images. Since the root cause clusters capture only the unsafe portion of the input space, a safe image might be assigned to cluster C j because it is accidentally closer to cluster C l . For this reason, HUDD only assigns an image to a cluster if, in addition to leading to the minimal SSE, it does not reduce cluster cohesion, i.e., it does not increase the intra-cluster distance. Otherwise the image is not assigned to any cluster. In Line 19, ICD_C j ′ and ICD_C j are the intra-cluster distances for the clusters C j ′ and C j , respectively.
Finally, to keep the size of the unsafe set manageable, HUDD selects up to U images per cluster. More precisely, for each cluster, it selects the U images with the lowest SSE. The selected images form the unsafe set, which are labeled by engineers when needed (Step 6 in Figure 5 ) and then used for retraining. HUDD balances the unsafe set with bagging, i.e., it randomly duplicates the images belonging to the cluster until it contains U members. The retraining process is expected to lead to an improved DNN model compared to that based on the original training set.
DNN Retraining

EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
Our empirical evaluation aims to address the following research questions RQ1 Does HUDD enable engineers to identify the root causes of DNN errors? This research question investigates whether images belonging to a same cluster, as generated by HUDD, present a common set of characteristics that are plausible causes of DNN errors. RQ2 How does HUDD compare to traditional DNN accuracy improvement practices? This research question investigates whether HUDD enables engineers to efficiently drive the retraining of a DNN compared to state-of-the-art approaches.
To perform our empirical evaluation we have implemented HUDD as a toolset that relies on the PyTorch [25] and SciPy [27] libraries. Our toolset, case studies, and results are available for download [2] .
Subjects of the study
To address RQ1, we need to devise effective means to identify the causes of DNN errors. Existing work relies on manual inspection of DNN inputs, with the intent to identify commonalities among error-inducing inputs [29] . Unfortunately, such manual inspection of so many inputs is time-consuming and error-prone.
In our experiments, to assess our approach, we need to objectively and systematically identify commonalities among images belonging to the same cluster. To do so, we rely on images generated using simulators as it allows us to associate each generated image to values of the configuration parameters of the simulator. These parameters, in turn, capture information about the characteristics of the elements in the image and can thus be used to identify the likely root causes of DNN errors.
We consider DNNs that implement the key features of a gaze detection system and a drowsiness detection system under development at IPA. The gaze detection system has been presented in Section 2.1. The drowsiness detection system features the same architecture as the gaze detection system, except that the DNN predicts whether eyes are closed (hereafter referred as ClosedDNNs). All DNNs have been implemented with PyTorch [25], following the AlexNet architecture [14] which is commonly used for image classification tasks.
The first two rows of Table 1 provide details about the two DNNs. Column Data Source reports the name of the simulator generating the images used to train and test the network. GazeDNN and ClosedDNN have been trained and tested with images generated by UnityEyes. Column Epochs reports the number of epochs considered to train the network. The two DNNs have been trained for a number of epochs sufficient to achieve accuracy above 85%. Columns Training Set Size and Test Set Size show the size of the training and the test set. Columns Accuracy Training and Accuracy Test show the accuracy obtained by the DNN when executed against images in the training and test sets.
The training and test sets for GazeDNN and ClosedDNN have been generated with UnityEyes. Since classes need to be balanced in order to properly train the DNN, for ClosedDNN, we select a subset of images consisting of all the closed eyes and a same number of open eyes. For GazeDNN this is not needed since UnityEyes selects the gaze angle according to a uniform distribution. Since HUDD can be applied to DNNs trained using simulator images or real images, to address RQ2, which concerns the improvement achieved after retraining the DNN, we also considered additional DNNs trained using real-world images. These additional DNNs are reported in rows three and four of Table 1 . We selected DNNs implementing body recognition (AslNN) and traffic sign recognition (TrafficNN), which are typical features of automotive, DNN-based systems.
AslNN automatically recognizes the letters of the American Sign Language alphabet based on pictures of human hands. It has been trained and tested using a collection of images of the ASL alphabet. TrafficNN recognizes the presence of traffic signs in pictures. It has been trained and tested using a collection of road images. The training and test sets for these two case studies have been obtained by randomly splitting the original data sets into three subsets including 50%, 25%, and 25% of the images. The first two subsets have been used for training and testing, while the third one serves as improvement set (see Section 5.2.4).
Measurements and Results
We leverage the availability of images generated by means of simulators to refine RQ1 into three complementary subquestions (RQ1.1, RQ1.2, RQ1.3). In the following, we describe the data collected to address RQ1.1, RQ1.2, RQ1.3, and RQ2, along with the results obtained.
RQ1.1. Do the clusters generated by HUDD show a significant reduction in variance for simulator parameters?
Design and measurements. This research question assesses if images belonging to the same cluster present similar characteristics. Since, in our case studies, images are generated by means of a simulator, images in a cluster should present similar values for a subset of the simulator parameters. In turn, this should result in a reduction of variance for these parameters in comparison to the entire error-inducing test set.
For a cluster of images C i , the rate of reduction in variance for a parameter p can be computed as follows:
variance of p for the images in C i variance of p for the entire error−inducing set Positive values for RR p C i indicate that clustering leads to reduced variance. Table 2 provides the list of parameters considered in our evaluation. We selected all the parameters provided by the simulator except the ones that capture coordinates of single points used to draw the pictures (e.g., eye landmarks) since these coordinates alone are not informative about the elements in the picture. However, we considered parameters capturing coordinates to compute metrics that capture information about the scene in the image. We refer to such metrics as derived parameters. For example, in the case of Distance between the pupil top and the top eyelid margin. DistToCenter Distance between the pupil center of the iris center. When the eye is looking middle center, this distance is below 11.5 pixels. Sky Exposure Captures the degree of exposure of the panoramic photographs reflected in the eye cornea. Sky Rotation Captures the degree of rotation of the panoramic photographs reflected in the eye cornea.
Light
Captures the degree of intensity of the main source of illumination. Ambient
Captures the degree of intensity of the ambient illumination.
UnityEyes, we compute the distance between the bottom of the pupil and the bottom eyelid margin (PupilToBottom in Table 2 ). The derived parameter PupilToBottom enables us to determine if the eye is in an unusual position, e.g., if the eye is at the bottom of the orbit. Hereafter, we use the term parameters to refer to both the selected simulator parameters and derived parameters.
We compute the percentage of clusters showing reduction in variance for at least one of the parameters. Since we do not know a priori the number of parameters that capture common error causes, we consider variance reduction in one parameter to be sufficient. However, since our parameters capture an heterogeneous set of characteristics, it is not possible to determine an objective reduction rate above which common causes can be noticed by humans. For this reason, we consider different rates of reduction in variance. More precisely, we compute the percentage of clusters with a reduction in variance between 0.0 and 0.9, with incremental steps of 0.10. To answer positively our research question, a high percentage of the clusters should show a reduction in variance for at least one of the parameters. Results. Figure 9 shows the percentage of clusters with variance reduction for at least one of the simulator parameters, at different reduction rates. HUDD identifies a total of 16 and 3 root cause clusters for GazeDNN and ClosedDNN, respectively.
Reduction
We can positively answer RQ1.1 since all the clusters present at least one parameter with a positive reduction rate (>0 in Figure 9) . Also, a very high percentage of the clusters (i.e., 93.75% for GazeDNN and 66.67% for ClosedDNN) include at least one parameter with a reduction rate above or equal to 0.5, i.e., a 50 percent reduction in variance. As can be expected, as the threshold considered for variance reduction increases, the percentage of clusters tends to decrease. For a 0.9 threshold, we obtain 97.56% for GazeDNN. Instead, none of the clusters of ClosedDNN show a variance reduction above 0.9.
RQ1.2. Does HUDD automatically identify the DNN layer that is more informative for DNN-error root cause analysis?
Design and measurements. HUDD automatically selects the DNN layer that provides the best clustering results based on heatmaps. This research question investigates if the layer selected by HUDD leads to the most informative clustering results, i.e., clusters including images with common error causes.
Since similarity among images is assumed to be related to common error causes, which in turn are captured by reduction in parameter variance, the layer selected by HUDD should be the one with clusters having the highest reduction in variance for at least one parameter. Thus, to address RQ1.2, we compute, for every layer, the average reduction in variance across all clusters, considering, for each cluster, the parameter showing the highest reduction rate. To positively answer this research question, HUDD should select the DNN layer with the highest average reduction in parameter variance across all clusters.
Results. Figure 10 shows two groups of boxplots reporting, for GazeDNN (10a) and for ClosedDNN (10b), the reduction rate of the parameter showing the highest reduction rate, for each cluster. The red line reports the average reduction in variance across all the clusters. The boxplots of the layer selected by HUDD are blue.
We can positively answer RQ1.2 since in both case studies, HUDD selects the layer with the highest average reduction in variance across all the clusters. For both cases, HUDD selects layer 9. The selected layer also features the highest median (thick black line), 0.99 for GazeDNN and 0.54 for ClosedDNN.
In the case of ClosedDNN, we may observe that all the layers lead to an average reduction in variance between 0.33 (layer 5) and 0.48 (layer 9). However, for layers 9 and 10, half of the clusters present a reduction rate above 0.5, as shown by the median. Layer 9 shows, however, the highest median and includes the cluster with the highest reduction rate, 0.84 (captured by the top whisker). In conclusion, the layer selected for ClosedDNN is also the most informative layer.
RQ1.3. Do parameters with high reduction in variance identify the plausible cause for DNN errors?
Design and measurements. With RQ1.3, we ask whether the commonalities of the images belonging to the root cause clusters can help engineers determine the root causes of the DNN errors. Value below which the pupil is mostly above the eyelid (i.e., -16 pixels).
We expect DNN errors to be triggered by specific portions of the input space, each one capturing a characteristic of the input images. To identify the portions of the input space that are unsafe for our case studies, based on domain knowledge, we have identified a set of parameters (hereafter, unsafe parameters) for which it is possible to identify values (hereafter, unsafe values) around which, or below which, we are likely to observe a DNN error. Table 3 provides the list of unsafe parameters along with the unsafe values identified. For example, for the Gaze Angle parameter, unsafe values consist of the boundary values used to label images with the gaze direction.
Root cause clusters that are explanatory should present at least one characteristic that is noticeable by the engineer, i.e., they should have at least one parameter with high (i.e., 50%) reduction in variance. In addition, at least one of the parameters with high variance reduction should be an unsafe parameter. Finally, the cluster average should be close to one unsafe value. For Gaze Angle, Openness, H_Headpose, and V_Headpose, since unsafe values split the parameters domain into subranges, we determine that the cluster average is close to one unsafe value if the difference between them is below 25% of the subrange including the average value. For DistToCenter, PupilToBottom, and PupilToTop, we simply check if the average is below or equal to the unsafe value. Finally, we compute the percentage of clusters for which the condition above holds. To answer positively to RQ1.3, this percentage should be high.
Results. In the case of GazeDNN, according to the conditions defined above, the percentage of clusters that identify the likely root cause of DNN errors is very high: 87.50% or 14 out of 16. For one of the two clusters not meeting the conditions, the unsafe parameter (i.e., DistToCenter) has a reduction in variance of 40%, below the
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Step Figure 11 : Baseline 2. The reduced improvement set is a subset of the improvement set used for HUDD.
50% threshold. This threshold is however arbitrary and the manual inspection of the cluster clearly shows that the commonality is the eye looking middle center. The other non-compliant cluster shows pupils being partially masked by the eyelid; however, we could not define a measure to systematically capture this situation based on simulator parameters. In the case of ClosedDNN, we obtain 66.66% (2 out of 3), with Openness being the unsafe parameter. The remaining cluster is characterized by thin almond eyes, which we could not systematically capture with simulator parameters. Based on the above observations, we respond positively to RQ1.3.
RQ2. How does HUDD compare to traditional DNN accuracy improvement practices?
This research question aims to compare the accuracy improvements achieved by HUDD with the improvements achieved by baseline approaches, which do not rely on the automated selection of predicted unsafe images. The only stateof-the-art approach that automatically identifies unsafe images is MODE, an expensive procedure (see Section 6 for a detailed comparison); unfortunately, we cannot empirically compare HUDD with MODE since it is not publicly available.
We consider two baseline approaches, namely Baseline1 and Baseline2. Baseline1 has been introduced in Section 2.2 and consists of selecting for retraining the misclassified images belonging to the labeled improvement set. Baseline2 is depicted in Figure 11 and consists of augmenting the training set with additional images randomly selected from the improvement set.
To not introduce bias in the results, we rely on the same experiment setting for all the approaches (i.e., same configuration of the DNN training algorithm, and same number of images to be labeled). In the case of HUDD, only the images in the unsafe set need to labeled. In the other cases, all the images in the improvement set need to be labeled. For this reason, for the two baselines, we select an improvement set that is a random subset of the improvement set used by HUDD (referred to as reduced improvement set) and has the same size as the unsafe set generated by HUDD. To account for randomness, we repeat the experiment 10 times.
With HUDD, for retraining the DNN, we applied the approach described in Section 4.4. For Baseline1, we configure bagging to generate an augmented labeled unsafe set with the same size as the balanced labeled unsafe set for HUDD. For Baseline2, consistent with Figure 11 , we retrain the DNN using the original training set and the labeled reduced improvement set.
To answer the research question, we compute the accuracy of the retrained models on the test set and compare the accuracy improvement obtained by HUDD with that obtained by the baselines. We considered all four case studies listed in Table 1 , namely GazeDNN, ClosedDNN, AslNN, and TrafficNN. The improvement set for GazeDNN and ClosedDNN has been generated through additional executions of UnityEyes. For AslNN and TrafficNN, we randomly selected 25% of the original datasets images.
Results. The first ten columns of Table 4 provide the number of images used to retrain the DNNs. We set the maximum number of images per cluster (i.e., U in Table 4 ) in such a way that it leads to an unsafe set with at least 1,000 elements but not more than one third of the original training set, in line with related work [16] . We set the bagging size according to the procedure in Section 4.4.
The remaining columns of Table 4 show the accuracy of the retrained models. Negative values indicate that the accuracy of the retrained model is worse than the original model. HUDD always fares significantly better than the baseline approaches. Based on a non-parametric Mann Whitney test, the difference in accuracy between HUDD and the baselines is always significant with a pvalue < 0.05.
HUDD improvements range from 0.4 to 9.38. On the other hand, Baseline1 and Baseline2 improvements range from -5.04 to 8.95 and -0.33 to 8.91, respectively. The negative results obtained by the two baselines for the case of GazeDNN show that retraining the DNN without targeting the DNN-error root causes may not lead to improved accuracy. The choice of an inadequate strategy for retraining DNNs is particularly detrimental since one could invest significant time and effort in labeling improvement set images without any benefit.
The difference in accuracy improvement between HUDD and the two baselines ranges between 0.40 (GazeDNN) and 1.03 (AslNN) for Baseline1, and 0.32 (AslNN) and 0.53 (ClosedDNN) for Baseline2. Given that all techniques cost the same according to our experiment design, it is therefore recommended to use HUDD. Though the differences are statistically significant, they are not large and there is still room for improvement. They may nevertheless be important in the context of critical applications.
Threats to validity. We target safety-critical, automotive systems. To address threats to generalizability, for RQ2, we have considered DNNs performing classification of body parts and road objects, typical features in automotive systems. For RQ1, we had to consider a subset of the case studies having high-resolution simulators available. Though HUDD background technology (i.e., LRP and HAC) is context-independent, future work will investigate the evaluation of the approach in different contexts (e.g., space industry).
RELATED WORK
Most of the software engineering approaches supporting testing and analysis of DNNs are summarized in recent surveys [8, 37] . Unfortunately, research on the automated debugging and repair of DNNs is still at very early stages [16, 36] .
Similarly to HUDD, MODE automatically identifies the images to be used to retrain a DNN [16] . However, it cannot identify the root causes of DNN errors, which is a major limitation in our context. HUDD and MODE differ also regarding the selection of images to be used for retraining, which, in the case of MODE, is not based on the heatmaps but on training additional DNN layers that capture commonalities among neuron activations leading to DNN errors. MODE, therefore, entails repeated modification and retraining of the DNN under test, just to select the improvement set, which is an expensive endeavor.
Different from HUDD, Apricot [36] repairs DNNs by changing the weights of the DNN model. It works by training multiple DNNs on subsets of the training and test sets. The repair process aims to minimize (maximize) the distance between the weights of the DNN to repair and the weights of DNNs leading to better (worse) accuracy. Unfortunately, without an extensive evaluation on a large set of case study systems, the alteration of DNN weights implemented by Apricot is unlikely to be accepted by safety certification bodies.
To summarize, HUDD is the first approach that automatically identifies distinct failure root causes in DNNs by applying clustering algorithms to heatmaps generated by DNN explanation techniques. Also, it does not rely on the modification of the learned DNN model.
CONCLUSION
In this paper we introduced HUDD, an approach that automatically identifies the different situations in which an image processing DNN is likely to produce erroneous results. HUDD generates clusters (i.e., root cause clusters) containing misclassified input images sharing a common set of characteristics that are plausible causes for errors. This is achieved through an hierarchical agglomerative clustering algorithm applied to heatmaps capturing the relevance of neurons of different DNN layers on the result.
In addition, HUDD minimizes the effort required to select and label additional images to be used to augment the training set and improve the DNN. This is done by automatically selecting images that are close to the centroid of the root cause clusters. Only these selected images are then labeled by engineers.
Empirical evaluation with simulator images show that HUDD generates clusters of images sharing similar values for some of the simulation parameters driving the generation of images. We can conclude that such clusters can then serve as a useful instrument for the identification of root causes of DNN errors. In turn, this information is important to safety analysis as it helps clearly characterize unsafe inputs, a requirement in safety standards. Our results, on both simulated and real images, also show how these clusters can be effectively used to select new images for retraining in a way that is more efficient than existing practices and leading to better DNN accuracy.
